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How Falling Behind the Joneses Fueled the Rise of Trump

Credit...Uli Seit for The New York Times

In his 1847 pamphlet, “Wage Labour and Capital,” Karl Marx made a point that turns out to be relevant to the Trump phenomenon and the 2016 presidential campaign:

A house may be large or small; as long as the neighboring houses are likewise small, it satisfies all social requirement for a residence. But let there arise next to the little house a palace, and the little house shrinks to a hut.

160 years later, in 2007, Robert Frank, an economist at Cornell and an expert in the field of “relative deprivation,” picked up the argument and suggested a thought experiment.

In it, you are asked to choose between living in a 4,000-square-foot house where all the neighbors have 6,000-square-foot homes or living in a 3,000-square-foot house where all the others are 2,000 square feet.

The most common choice, Frank reported, was the 3,000-square-foot house. Even though a 4,000-square-foot house has more room in absolute terms, the 3,000-square-foot house has more relative value compared with its neighbors.

In 2008, Frank’s idea was expanded by Thomas Leonard, an economist at Princeton:

Housing is a positional good: we get additional satisfaction from a larger house not only because a larger house is better in absolute terms, but also because a larger house is better is relative terms. That is, we get additional satisfaction from having more house than the Joneses next door. Trouble is, the Joneses are no different, and when they too work harder to fund their own bigger house, our relative satisfaction gain disappears. We are now merely keeping up with the Joneses.

Trump’s white working class supporters — who provide somewhere between 58 and 62 percent of his votes, according to data from NBC and ABC polls — have suffered a stunning loss of relative status over the past 40 years.

Their wages have stagnated or declined; the ascendance of minorities has threatened their cultural dominance; and the growth of an increasingly large and affluent upper middle class has pushed goods and services once viewed as theirs by right beyond their reach.

As Frank explained in Vox last year:

The median new house in the U.S. is now 50 percent larger than it was in 1980, even though the median income has grown only slightly in real terms. Houses are growing faster than incomes because of a process I call “expenditure cascades.”

In an email exchange with me, Frank observed that

For those who are not absolutely poor, the central economic question is, “Do we have enough income to achieve our goals?” The answer depends to a significant extent on the spending of other families in the community. Most families want to send their children to good schools, for example, but a family’s ability to achieve that goal depends on how much other families are spending on housing. That’s because school quality is an inescapably relative concept.

The problems of positional status and relative deprivation are fueled by income inequality, Frank argues:

A family at the median income level would reasonably aspire to send its children to schools of at least average quality. But to do that, it would have to buy or rent a house near the median of its city’s housing price distribution. And that’s become significantly harder to do.

In effect, the increase in the resources commandeered by the overclass has pulled the rug out from under the once upwardly mobile white working class.

Housing is a key example of the rising cost of positional goods, but there are many others. “Most families reasonably aspire to host a reception for their daughter’s wedding that guests would remember as special,” Frank writes in the Vox piece, but “the inflation-adjusted cost of the average wedding in the U.S. was $31,000 in 2015, up from about $10,000 in 1980.”

A May 2015 Federal Reserve report provides a window into the financial condition of many in the working class. It found that 47 percent of Americans do not have the resources to cover a $400 bill for such unanticipated costs as a car repair or a health emergency. They would be forced to borrow from friends of family, to sell something, to go to a payday loan company or to add to their credit card debt.

For those in the bottom third of the income distribution, even essential expenditures have become unaffordable: the $7,000 to $10,000 average cost of a funeral, the $33,865 average cost of a new car, the $18,000 average annual cost of child care.

Crucially important is the fact that rising inequality constitutes a double whammy. It raises the cost of sought-after goods and it increases the economic gap between the working class and the affluent, spurring nostalgia for what was (even if what was really wasn’t).

This point was well put in an essay, “Keeping Up With the Joneses,” by Neil Fligstein, a professor of sociology at Berkeley, Pat Hastings, a Ph.D. candidate at Berkeley, and Adam Goldstein, professor of sociology at Princeton, which was presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association:

Growing income inequality in the U.S. has meant that as those at the top are able bid up the price of valued goods like housing and access to good schools, those in lower groups have struggled to maintain their positions.

A September 2014 Demos study found that median white family wealth is $134,000. Among whites in the working class, however — the bottom 32.1 percent — the average net worth is $0.

In July 2014, USA Today estimated that in the United States, where the median household income was $53,567, the minimum annual cost of living the American dream was $130,357.

The diminished status of white working class men, however, is not limited to dollars and cents. For some of these men, there is a less talked-about sense of status displacement that stems from the surge of women, including wives, girlfriends and daughters, into the work force. This has served to focus attention on the erosion of the traditional male self-image as provider and protector.

By 2011, nearly a quarter of married women (24.3 percent) made more money than their husbands. For working class white men, the economic ascendance of women taps into what psychologists describe as anxiety and anger about “precarious masculinity.”

A Public Religion Research Institute survey in March found that half of Trump’s supporters — more than any other candidate’s — believe that society would benefit if “women adhere to traditional gender roles.”

Joseph Vandello, a professor of psychology at the University of South Florida, who has published extensively about “precarious masculinity,” wrote in an email:

Manhood is an uncertain, tenuous status and one that is easily threatened; thus, men will often take compensatory measures to restore or affirm manhood. In this case, manhood can be affirmed symbolically through one’s vote or show of support to a candidate who embodies manhood.

For working class whites, Vandello wrote, the loss of their privileged status and loss of manufacturing jobs go to the

core of what it means to be a man in our culture — being the protector and provider.

David Geary, a psychologist at the University of Missouri, told me by email that the practice among liberal interest groups of

highlighting group differences, cultures, etc. has contributed to Trump’s appeal, especially given that white men are often blamed for being oppressive or the source of many of the issues being protested.

The result in the white working class, Geary argues, is to sharpen the us-versus-them character of politics.

You cannot consistently have different groups arguing for equality, protesting etc. without creating an in-group, out-group mentality — an evolved bias that is easily invoked — within the U.S.

Steven Pinker, a professor of psychology at Harvard, shares Geary’s view that Trump supporters are, to some extent, responding to what they see as excesses on the left. In an email, Pinker argued that Trump

has been inadvertently aided by the left’s history of heavy-handed policing of speech about race and sex known as “political correctness.” Of course respect for women and racial minorities is not political correctness — it is just decency. But well-known excesses in the policing of speech have handed Trump a gift: he can rationalize despicable attitudes as honest reactions to political correctness. In this way he multiplies the effectiveness of his taboo-shattering campaign. Supporters don’t perceive him as merely publicizing their ugly private beliefs; they perceive him as speaking truth to power.

Many of Trump’s supporters have been left behind, marginalized by the economic, cultural and demographic transformations brought about by globalization. Trump likes to assure these beleaguered voters that he will restore their vanished status, but the reality is that his chaotic appropriation of right-wing populism — its threats and its promises — is fraudulent, as bereft of value as his bankrupt casinos.

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